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The Voluntary Export Restraint: Bad Medicine for a Sick Patient
Abstract
When former General Motors chairman Charles "Engine Charlie" Wilson told Congress in 1952, "...what is
good for the country is good for General Motors, and what is good for General Motors is good for the
country" (Greenwald 45), he articulated the attitudes the American auto companies had about the
economic and social relationship between the United States and its automobile industry. That was true in
1952, but since then American interests and those of its car manufacturers, have diverged significantly
because of the auto makers' single minded devotion to high short run profits and their inability to change
quickly enough to meet a dynamic consumer demand. Nowhere is this more evident than in an analysis of
the rise of Japanese car makers in the U.S. auto market, especially with respect to the Voluntary Export
Restraint (VER).
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The Voluntary Export Restraint:
Bad Medicine for a Sick Patient
by Joshua Yount
Introduction
When former General Motors chairman Charles "Engine
Charlie" Wilson told Congress in 1952, "...what is good for the
country is good for General Motors, and what is good for General
Motors is good for the country" (Greenwald 45), he articulated
the attitudes the American auto companies had about the economic
and social relationship between the United States and its
automobile industry. That was true in 1952, but since then
American interests and those of its car manufacturers, have
diverged significantly because of the auto makers' single minded
devotion to high short run profits and their inability to change
quickly enough to meet a dynamic consumer demand. Nowhere is this
more evident than in an analysis of the rise of Japanese car
makers in the U.S. auto market, especially with respect to the
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). After U.S. auto makers missed
the compact car boat in the 1970's, they came to the government
on their hands and knees pointing to their balance sheets,
uttering "Engine Charlie's" immortal words and begged for protection from competition. Still, they hadn't learned their
lesson. After they got the VER, U.S. car makers grabbed the quick
cash and only belatedly, with selective models, did they try to
catch up with the Japanese. In the end, American auto makers and
consumers paid, and are still paying the price of the
consequences of the car companies' flawed approach to an
automobile market. No longer engrossed in the tail fin, the
approach is one based on dynamic efficiency, international
competition, and high consumer expectations.
History
The late 1960's and 70's were not only a time of
unprecedented political and social change, marking the loss of
innocence for the baby boom generation, but also served as a time
of change in international economics. Nowhere was that more
evident than in the automobile industry. Starting in the late
1960's and continuing through the entire decade of the 70's, the
Japanese made serious inroads into the American automobile market
by producing small, fuel efficient cars with an emphasis on
quality. The initial success of Japanese producers in the U.S.
automobile market rested on four factors, cited by Robert
Crandall: the rise in oil prices created by the OPEC cartel's
restriction of petroleum supply, the introduction of new federal
safety and emissions regulations, the overall superior quality
and longevity of Japanese cars, and the major cost advantages
held by Japanese auto makers. First, the two oil shocks of the
70's greatly inflated the price of gasoline, and in the land of
"fuel efficient" cars like the Cadillac El Dorado and the Ford
Thunderbird, the rise in the price of gasoline had a major effect
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on American consumer income. The Japanese producers of the small,
fuel efficient cars suddenly found themselves on the leading edge
of consumer demand. Second, not only did American companies find
themselves lagging behind in car styling, but because of new
federal regulations, U.S. car makers were also lacking in safety
and emissions control improvements, totaling approximately $1000
a car. Third, Japanese cars had superior quality and needed fewer
repairs. In fact, they were rated three to four times better than
the cars the big three were producing in 1981. Finally, the
reason most cited by experts and non-experts, and the most
difficult to overcome for U.S. auto companies, was Japan's
substantial and significant cost advantage due to lower
comparative wages, greater productivity, smaller inventories, and
a devalued yen matched with a strong dollar (8-11).
These four factors proved disastrous for the American auto
industry, which lost 10% of its market share in just five years
to the Japanese (Collyns and Dunaway 152). The bad times came to
a head in 1980 when all four auto makers posted combined losses
of $4.2 billion, Chrysler was bailed out by the government, and
American Motors was bought by Renault (Pomfret 57). In addition,
there was a 39% unemployment rate in the American auto industry
and among its suppliers (McGowan and Vaughn 416). In response,
both Ford and the United Auto Workers filed petitions with the
government requesting assistance. The U.S. International Trade
Commission ruled that the U.S. car makers' inability to meet the
consumer demand for small fuel efficient cars was the primary
cause of their demise, not Japanese car makers. So instead of
trade restrictions the Carter administration proposed an industry
aid package. Trade restrictions were not far off, though. When
Ronald Reagan took office, his administration launched the
Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which enhanced Carter's aid
package by providing tax relief, relaxing regulations, and
pressuring the Japanese into proposing a Voluntary Export
Restraint of 1.68 billion cars per year (McGowan and Vaughan
416-17). Reagan hoped that these supposedly temporary measures
would bolster domestic auto makers' sales, providing them with
time to catch up with Japan on down-sizing, re-styling, fuel
efficiency, quality, and productivity (Crandall 12). By following
these steps, the expectation was that U.S. auto makers would
recapture their lost market share and the U.S. economy would be
able to regain 300,000 lost auto worker jobs (Pomfret 57).
The Reagan administration continued to request the quota
through March of 1985, with an increase to 1.85 million cars per
year in 1984. Then, because of the reassurgence of the U.S. auto
industry and the record profits posted by domestic producers, the
U.S. did not request a continuation of the VER. Nevertheless,
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) took
the voluntary aspect of the agreement to heart and continued the
quota system after raising the limit to 2.3 million cars per year
(Omichi 49-50). MITI claimed to be continuing the VER to prevent
anti-import feelings in the U.S. and thus continued the VER at
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2.3 million cars per year until 1992 when the quota was cut back
to 1.65 million as the U.S. auto industry once again faced hard
times (Johnson 1). The effects of this most recent cut in the
quota have yet to be registered, but reliable predictions can be
made-from the observed effects on Japanese producers, U.S.
producers, and U.S. consumers in the first ten years of the
U.S.-Japan Voluntary Export Restraint.
Effects on Japanese Producers
It seems evident that the Voluntary Export Restraint has
been beneficial to Japan if only because of MITI's insistence on
maintaining the quota past 1985 when the U.S. stopped requesting
its continuation. The reasons for MITI's continuation of the
quota lie in the effects it has had on Japanese auto makers, some
intended, many not. The first and most noticeable, as well as
predicted effect of the VER on Japanese automobile exports, was
the sudden and marked increase in price, $2825 per car in 1984
alone (Collyns and Dunaway 162-5, 169). Dardis and Lin argue that
the price increase can be attributed to the reduction in supply
the quotas forced on Japanese auto makers (278-9)(Fig 1). After
the VER was instituted the supply curve became SES' with P3 as
the new higher price and Q3 as the new lower quantity. However,
the rise in price due to a restriction in supply, known as the
pure price effect, was not the only change in the automobile
market, though. Another important factor affecting consumer
choice and the prices of Japanese cars was the fundamental change
in the types of cars sold by Japanese auto makers. The Japanese
moved upscale to produce higher quality, more expensive cars
because they could no longer sell as many cheap small cars as
they wished in the U.S. (Dardis and Lin 278). In fact, Robert
Feenestra estimates that Japanese cars improved quality-wise by
30% between 1980 and 1985 (143). The upscale shift in product mix
again alters the supply curve (Fig 3). The greater production
costs of higher quality cars shifts the supply curve out to
S'ES', with EF representing the cost of higher quality, CP2-P}) ,
known as the quality effect, section c, leaving section a,
(P,- P 2 ), to represent the pure price effect. Although the higher
prices reduced sales by 1.5 million cars in 1984 (Q.,- Q3) , the
increase in price more than compensated for the loss in revenue
due to the loss in sales; producers gained sections a and c, and
lost section b (Dardis and Lin 279-80). The exact amounts of
these gains depend on the assumptions about the reactions of U.S.
producers, who also raised price and improved quality. If the
pure price effect is assumed to be equal between the producers of
the two nations, then Japanese producers gained $1.00 billion in
1984. On the other hand, if the quality effect was equal, then
they gained $5.21 billion! (Collyns and Dunaway 166-9) (Table 1
p.13). The likely result lies somewhere in between the two
extremes, but the attractiveness of the quotas for Japanese auto
makers is certainly evident.
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Market for Japanese auto makers
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Besides price increases and quality improvement, the VER
affected Japanese producers in many ways. Since the VER caused
Japanese car prices to increase more than U.S. prices, price
competition was no longer as viable a competitive strategy as it
was prior to the VER. Consequently the Japanese turned to
non-price sales efforts to maintain market share. Quality
improvement was one important step. No longer solely producers of
econo-boxes, Lermses and Acuras began to roll off Japanese auto
makers8 production lines ("Goalsw 69). The second important
non-price sales effort was advertising. After the VER was
instituted in 1981, Japanese auto companies' advertising
expenditures increased significantly in order to facilitate
product differentiation by promoting new, higher quality models,
and to increase brand admiration by fighting anti-import fever.
Who can forget people jumping up and down about Toyotas, singing,
"1 love what you do for me, Toyota!I1? These two steps kept
Japanese companies from losing their entire market share and
proved to make them stronger competitors in the long run.
In addition to the strengthening effects on Japanese car makers
of increased profits, quality, product differentiation, and brand
admiration, Richard Pomfret describes two precedents set by the
VER that greatly benefited the Japanese. The first was the trend
that the VER set toward instituting anti-free trade agreements,
subsequently followed by much of Europe and Canada. Because these
VERs limited the supply of cars that could be exported, the
profits that could be made exporting cars were squeezed (58-9).
If the equation (P,
equals the profits from
exporting, r,,
protits
-c will
-t)'kno be able to grow significantly
because the quota fixes q,. This opens up foreign direct investment as a more profita%le option, where (Pfdi-c)qfdi-Ffdi
equals profits afdi(Martin 339-42). Cars built in the country
they are sold in are not subject to a quota, therefore, profits
Os
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can grow. Aided by the small MES of Japanese auto plants, the
Japanese set up shop in America through joint ventures in places
like Freemont, California and Bloomington, Illinois, and alone in
places like Marysville, Ohio and Smyrna, Tennessee (Omichi 50;
Rice 22). This proved to be a very wise move because it helped
spread risk for when the dollar weakened, as it did in 1985, and
provided producers with a quota-free place to build cars (Martin
339-42; Berger 61). The most helpful effect of the VER for
Japanese producers was the de facto approval of a Japanese
automobile producer cartel, by letting them limit quantity and
drive up price, the same way OPEC drove up oil prices in the
70's. The big problem for the U.S. was that it couldn't complain
of the anti-competitive nature of MITI's setting of a quota and
allocating market shares because the U.S. was the one who
suggested the quota in the first place (Pomfret 58). These
precedents are the lasting legacy of the VER and in the long run
may be the VER's greatest cost to both the American auto industry
and the U.S. economy.
Although the VER was primarily instituted to make U.S. car
manufacturers stronger, it was also hoped that, in turn, Japanese
producers would be hurt. Yet besides an initial 7.5% drop in
market share, that .was subsequently recovered, Japanese auto
makers were not hurt at all. In fact, increased profits, improved
quality, greater brand admiration, foreign direct investment, and
a legal cartel seem to be the true effects on Japanese car
companies of the same Voluntary Export Restraint that was
supposed to save the American auto industry.
Effects on U.S. Producers
As with Japanese producers, the U.S. auto makers believed
the VER to be beneficial because they felt that the VER
compensated for the tax and currency advantages held by the
Japanese, thus allowing American car companies to be competitive
(Callahan and Williams 40; Iacocca 227-30; Fisher 21-3). Because
the supply of Japanese cars was limited, their price rose
significantly (figs 1 & 2), (table 1). In turn, this caused the
demand for U.S. automobiles, a substitute, to rise, ultimately
raising the price of American cars (Dardis and Lin 282-4) (fig
3). The attractiveness of this policy can be seen by looking at
the increase in revenue that results when demand shifts to D',
price rises to p2, and quantity increases to q2, causing revenue
to increase from p^q.jB to p20q2A. In 1984, these market
alterations caused domestic car prices to rise $1,187, and
assuming equal pure price effects, $4.93 billion in transfers
from consumers to producers occurred, versus $1.27 billion in
transfers assuming equal quality effects (Collyns and Dunaway
166-9) (table 2 p.13).
Because domestic producers raised price less than the
Japanese, their market share rose 6.75% in 1984, to leave U.S.
produced car sales unaffected in the face of the industry wide
decline in sales due to the across the board price hikes by all
producers (Coughlin and Wood 39). Although sales did not change,
Illinois Wesleyan University
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Figure 3
Demand and supply for U.S. auto makers

ql Q2
profits reached record levels for all U.S. car makers, totaling
$9.8 billion in 1984, for three primary reasons (Omicni 50).
First, and most importantly, prices jumped $1,187 per car, which
alone would have substantially increased profits. Second, and
counter to the aims of the VER, automakers employed less labor
per automobile because of the introduction of robots and
automation into auto plants (Dardis and Lin 289). Third, the
labor that U.S. auto makers did employ came cheaper than it did
before, because each of the big three secured wage and benefits
concessions from its workers (Crandall 13).
Although retooling and reducing the number of workers
necessary to build a car represent positive long run steps taken
by American car manufacturers, for them it was a case of too
little too late. For example, it was at least ten years before
U.S. auto companies could offer up even a few truly competitive
car models. Rather than investing more of their short run profits
to quickly catch up with the Japanese on productivity, quality,
and styling, auto executives purchased financial, aircraft, and
computer companies, wrote books, headed monument restoration
commissions, and gave themselves hefty bonuses for earning
profits from a restrictive trade agreement. While American auto
companies and their executives hid behind the VER counting their
money, as the 80's went on, Japan and other nations improved
their competitiveness and started to gain market share from the
big three once again. For non-quota countries such as South
Korea, the VER provided its car companies, like Hyundai, with an
opportunity to sneak into the low end of the market and emulate
Japan's low price strategies of the 1970's (Pomfret 58; Berger
61). For Japan, strategies such as foreign direct investment and
The Park Place Economist/Spring 1993
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increased sales efforts allowed them to whittle away at domestic
producer market share. Overall it seems that the VER, in
contradiction to what it originally intended to bring about,
resulted in encouraging increased competition from abroad, while
fostering foot dragging and complacency in Detroit.
Effects on U.S. Consumers
Both Japanese and American automobile manufacturers
received benefits and absorbed costs from the Voluntary Export
Restraint to greater and lesser degrees, but one group was
fortunate enough to endure only one kind of result; that group
being consumers and that result being monumental costs. The most
obvious cost to consumers lies in the rise in price of both
Japanese and American cars, totaling $1,649 per car in 1984,
considering pure price and quality effects (Collyns and Dunaway
161 3,166-9) (table 3 p.13). The per car cost translates into
both transfers to producers and deadweight loss (fig 4) as prices
rise from p1 to p2 because of the VER's reduction in consumer
surplus. Section a represents a transfer from consumers to

Figure 4

Costs to U.S. consumers
$

P2
Pi

q2

ql

producers, which only considering pure price effects equaled
$5.47 billion in 1984, and Section b represents the deadweight
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loss, which under the same assumption, equaled $130 million in
that year (Collyns and Dunaway 166-9). Many people, such as "free
trader" Lee lacocca, would justify these costs by saying that
even if it didn't create jobs, the VER saved jobs, for a while at
least. Crandall and others estimate that the VER saved between
40,000 and 75,000 jobs, at a cost of nearly $160,000 per job per
year (Crandall 16; Coughlin and Wood 39). Although this may be
far below Mr. lacocca's hefty salary, it would be an
extraordinarily large paycheck for an auto worker. The VER surely
must have seemed to be a fairly simple answer to the U.S. auto
industry's woes back in 1981. Unfortunately for U.S. consumers no
one was looking out for the woes this policy would inflict on
them. Consequently, they paid the price.
Conclusion
In 1991 when President George Bush led a trade negotiation
mission to Japan, bringing with him the heads of the big three
U.S. auto makers, the true folly of the Voluntary Export
Restraint became apparent. The U.S. auto makers, once again
feeling the squeeze of a weak economy and competition from
abroad, made a lot of noise about unfair competition and domestic
content percentages. Their behavior stems from two possible
causes: first, that U.S. auto makers pulled their favorite
scapegoat out of the closet as they usually do when business
turns sour, and second that the U.S. still lags behind Japan in
productivity, styling, and quality. The true cause is probably a
little of both, but since it seems that the U.S., after ten years
of the VER, has not caught up with the Japanese, it would follow
the VER has failed to achieve its objectives. In fact, if the
effects on Japanese producers and consumers are considered, the
VER failed miserably, leaving behind as its legacy a fiercely
competitive Japanese automobile cartel, a complacent, excuse
making American auto industry, and scores of consumers stung by
artificially high car prices. The fact that the VER did not help
the U.S. auto industry in the long run points to another reason
for its existence. As Dardis and Lin suggest, the Voluntary
Export Restraint was, and always will be a political measure
enacted to placate workers and producers, not an economic
solution to a deep-seeded problem of gross mismanagement and
inability to meet consumer demand (290-1).
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